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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).

Issues Presented for Review
This case is before the Court on a Writ of Certiorari. Pursuant to this
Court's Order, the sole issue to be considered is "Whether the court of appeals
lacked appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal in this case." Exhibit A,
Order Granting Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for
correctness, giving no deference to its conclusions of law. See. Carrier v. ProTech Restoration. 944 P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997).

Controlling Rules
Utah R. App. P. 3
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from
a district or juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal
from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within the time allowed by Rule
4. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice
of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of
the appeal or other sanctions short of dismissal as well as the award of attorney
fees.

1

Utah R. App. P. 4
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30
days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from....
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)
(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a judgment....
(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, served upon the other parties a
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or
upon expiration of the time to object.

Statement of the Case
On July 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter. (R. at 1-5.) An
Amended Complaint was filed October 27, 2004. (R. at 55-59.) Defendants filed
a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based on Governmental Immunity. (R. at 1011, 64-66.) On January 10, 2005, the district court filed a memorandum decision
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Exhibit B, Memorandum Decision.)
The Court made no instructions regarding the preparation of an order and
Defendant did not prepare an order as provided by Utah R. Civ. P. 7.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs counsel prepared an order dismissing the case, which was
signed by the district court on February 25, 2005. (Exhibit C, Order of Dismissal.)
2

Plaintiff timely filed its Notice of Appeal from the February 25, 2005 Order of
Dismissal. (R. at 76-78.)
Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Disposition arguing
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction because the district court's
Memorandum Decision constituted a final order. Plaintiff responded and on May
19, 2005 the Court of Appeals reserved ruling on the motion pending briefing on
the merits. (Exhibit D, Court of Appeals Order.) Subsequent to briefing on the
merits of the appeal, the Court of Appeals issued the opinion at issue here on
March 23, 2006, dismissing Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Exhibit E,
Court of Appeals Opinion.)

Summary of Arguments
The appellate courts have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs appeal in this matter
as Plaintiff timely appealed from the final order of the district court. Utah R. Civ.
P. 7(f) requires that for every court order, the prevailing party shall prepare an
order in conformity with the Court's decision, unless the Court signs a previously
submitted proposed order, "or unless otherwise directed by the court." While the
district court's memorandum decision used language that created an illusion of
finality, the district court's decision must be read in light of the guidelines of Rule
7(f). When Rule 7(f) is applied, the district court's decision was not final absent
counsel's preparation of an order. Defendants' counsel having chosen not to
3

prepare an order, Plaintiffs counsel properly prepared the order, and appealed
therefrom, thus vesting the appellate courts with jurisdiction.

Argument
I.

Given the Language of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), the Memorandum
Decision of the District Court Was Not a Final Judgment or Order.
"[The Rules of Civil Procedure] shall govern the procedure in the courts of

the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature ... except
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the
Legislature..." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). "When interpreting court rules, we apply our
rules of statutory construction with an understanding that rules, like statutes, are
'passed as a whole and not as parts or sections.'" Cox v. Krammer. 2003 UT App
264,flO, 76 P.3d 184, citing, State v. Maestas. 2002 UT 123, fl54, 63 P.3d 621.
Under Utah R. App. P. 3(a), "An appeal may be taken from a district or
juvenile court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final
orders and judgments...by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the time allowed by Rule 4." Utah R. App. P. 4 requires an appeal to be
filed within 30 days after the entry of the order appealed from. The absence of a
final judgment generally deprives the appellate courts of jurisdiction. See. A.J.
MacKav Co. v. Okland Const. Co.. Inc.. 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991).
Likewise, failure to timely file a notice of appeal following entry of a final judgment

4

or order deprives the Court of jurisdiction. See. Serrano v. Utah Transit Authority.
2000 UT App 299, ff7, 13 P.3d 616.
"[A]n order is final where 'the effect of the order... was to determine
substantial rights ... and to terminate finally the litigation..."' Harris v. IES Assoc.
Inc.. 2003 UT App 113, fl56, 69 P.3d 297, citing. Cahoon v. Cahoon. 641 P.2d
140,142 (Utah 1982). The memorandum decision issued by the district court in
this case did not finally terminate the litigation.
The Court of Appeals erroneously reached the opposite conclusion. The
Court of Appeals focused solely on the last sentence of the district court's
memorandum decision, which stated, "For the reasons stated above, the Court
dismisses Plaintiffs claim." Under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, "No
further order was invited or contemplated by the terms of the Memorandum
Decision, nor is such even implied by the decision's language." Code v. Utah
Dep't. of Health. 2006 UT App 113, fl4, 133 P.3d 438.
However, the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this regard, which looks
only to the language of judicial precedent, runs directly contrary to the governing
rules of procedure.1 Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2) states in pertinent part, "Unless the
court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or
unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen

1

The Rules of Criminal Procedure contain a similar requirement. See. Utah
R. Crim. P. 26 (a), (b).
5

days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision." (Italics added.) Rule 7(f)(1) defines "order"
to include "every direction of the court, including a minute order entered in writing,
not included in a judgment."
Under the plain language of Rule 7, for every order, not included in a
judgment, the prevailing party is to submit an order in conformity with the court's
decision, unless otherwise directed. The language of the rule makes such action
mandatory. This is clearly at odds with the holding of the Court of Appeals, which
held that because the district court dismissed the claim without inviting
preparation of an order by counsel, it left nothing more to be done. Code, at fl6.
The Court of Appeals further reasoned that the district court's language, although
it did not specifically direct counsel, implicitly directed prevailing counsel not to file
a proposed order. ]d- However, Rule 7(f) does not invite counsel to divine the
intentions of the district court in this regard. Rule 7(f) plainly states that unless
the district court signs a previously submitted order, or unless the district court
otherwise directs, the prevailing party shall prepare an order. Under Rule 7(f),
the memorandum decision of the district court explained the court's rationale and
set forth the direction of the Court. Action was still required on the part of the
Defendant to bring finality to the case. Had Plaintiff appealed from the
memorandum decision, the appeal would have been premature and the Court of
Appeals would have lacked jurisdiction.
6

In her concurring opinion, Judge McHugh came closer to the correct
analysis, but still missed the mark. She noted the plain language of the rule, but
wrote it off as nothing more than a conflict between court precedent and the rule,
which "can lead to confusion for practitioners." Code, at fl11, (McHugh, J.
concurring.) Judge McHugh's reasoning was equally misplaced as that of the
majority opinion, by concluding that the apparent conflict between appellate court
precedent and the Rules of Civil Procedure should be written off as nothing more
than potentially confusing.
The likelihood of confusion that Judge McHugh noted in her concurring
opinion is abundantly evident in the decision of the Court of Appeals as this case
should require nothing more than to read and apply the literal language of Rule
7(f)(2).2 Indeed, the rule as articulated by the Court of Appeals mischieviously
creates more confusion for the members of the bar than it resolves. Instead of
relying on the plain application of Rule 7(f) upon receipt of a judge's

2

Our research revealed only one appellate opinion where the interplay
between finality and Rule 7(f) was even mentioned. In Oseauera v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange. 2003 UT App 46, 1[4, 68 P.3d 1008, a district court entered
a judgment, which the Court of Appeals noted "precluded the usual circulation
among the parties of a proposed judgment and the opportunity to object prior to
its entry" under Utah Code Judic. Admin. R 4-504(1), (2) (2003), the predecessor
to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The Court of Appeals stated nothing more concerning the
issue in the case, nor does it appear to have considered whether the predecessor
to Rule 7 may have prevented the finality of a judgment that might otherwise
appear final. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had abused its
discretion in refusing to award relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), where the
party had no notice of the entry of judgment, id- at fi12.
7

memorandum decision, practicioners will have to play a guessing game to divine
the court's intentions. This case demonstrates just how prejudicial the results of
such a game can be on parties to litigation - A correct guess allows the case to
proceed, while an incorrect guess scuttles appeal rights. Whereas simple
application of Rule 7(f) does away with the potential for inconsistent conclusions.
In this case, the trial court issued a memorandum decision, which falls
squarely under the procedure spelled out by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). The
memorandum decision did not bring finality to the case, but consistent with the
rule, required the preparation of an order by the Defendant as prevailing party
because the district court did not otherwise direct. When no such order was
prepared, Plaintiff prepared an order in conformity with the trial court's decision,
which was signed by the trial court notwithstanding Defendant's finality
objections, and timely appealed therefrom. A further order was contemplated and
required by Rule 7(f). Plaintiffs order prepared pursuant thereto, once signed by
the trial court, constituted the final order for purposes of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Plaintiffs timely appeal therefrom vested the Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction. The decision of the Court of Appeals holding to the contrary should
be reversed by this Court.

8

Conclusion
A determination of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this matter
requires simple application of the plain language of Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The
district court's memorandum decision did not bring finality to the case because it
did not so explicitly direct. Under Rule 7(f), given the absence of contrary
indication from the district court, counsel was required to prepare an order to
confirm the direction of the district court. Given Defendants' failure to prepare a
proposed order as required by rule, Plaintiffs counsel appropriately prepared an
order for the district court's signature to conform to Rule 7(f)'s requirement. This
order was the final order in the case, and Plaintiff timely filed its appeal
subsequent to its entry. The opinion of the Court of Appeals determining that it
lacked jurisdiction was incorrect as a matter of law, and should be accordingly
reversed.
DATED this

day of August, 2006.
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.

Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C Rasmussen
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on this

/o

day of August, 2006,1 mailed, postage

prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief, to the
following individuals:
Brent A. Burnett
Debra A. Moore
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
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Exhibit A
Order on Petition for Writ of Certiorari
April 24, 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT-OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FILED

00O00

JUN 3 0 2006
Nicole H. Code, f.k.a.
Nicole L. Handrahan,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20060372-SC
20050255-CA

v.
Utah Department of Health and
Utah School for the Deaf and Blind,
Defendants/Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on April 24, 2006.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted only as to the following issue:
Whether the court of appeals lacked appellate jurisdiction
to adjudicate the appeal in this case.

A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits
the parties to stipulate to an extension of tame to submit their
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not 'be permitted to
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its
issuance.
FOR THE COURT:

y^/ 10 %06A
/

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice

Exhibit B
District Court Memorandum Decision
January 10, 2005

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

NICOLE H. CODE, f.k.a NICOLE L.
HANDRAHAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND
BLIND,

i

Judge Ernie W. Jones
Case No. 040905007

Defendants.

Plaintiff commenced this action claiming that Defendant Utah School for the Deaf and
Blind ("USDB") wrongfully terminated her employment without allowing her the notice and
grievance procedures. According to the Plaintiff, USDB terminated her as it would have
terminated a temporary employee, although it should have treated her as a permanent employee.
Plaintiff claims that her former employer, Defendant Utah Department of Health, failed to update
her employment status properly prior to her lateral transfer to the USDB.
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) Plaintiff was a statutory
employee rather than a contractual employee and, thus, cannot prevail on a contractual theory; (2)
as a statutory employee, her wrongful termination claim arises from the Utah Personnel
Management Act ("PMA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-42, statute, and, thus,
Plaintiffs failure to commence the claim within three years of its accrual bars it as untimely

Memorandum Decision
Case No 040905007
Page 2 of 5
under Utah Code Ami. § 78-12-26(4); and (3) the Governmental Immunity Act ("GIA") also bars
Plaintiffs wrongful termination action because she failed to file a notice of claim, Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-12(2000).
For her part, Plaintiff argues that, because the USDB treated her as a temporary
employee, which the PMA exempts from its raree/ service protections against termination
without sufficient cause, Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-15(l)(l), § 67-19-18, her employment arose
not from statute but from a contract expressed by the State Human Resources Employee
Handbook. Thus, Plaintiff argues, her cause of action is contractual, and she timely commenced
it within the four-year statute of limitations for actions arising from a contract. Utah Code Aim. §
78-12-25(1). Further, Plaintiff argues that Utah Code Ann. § 62-30-5 exempts her breach of
contract claim from the GIA's notice requirement.
The Court grants Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
If Plaintiff s claim is true that she was a permanent employee and that the USDB had to
follow termination procedures and hear her grievances as required by the PMA, then her claim is
statutory rather than contractual, and it must fail because it was not brought within the three-year
statute of limitations period and she did not file the notice of claim as required under the GIA.
On the other hand, if Plaintiff s claim that she was a permanent employee was mistaken,
then her wrongful termination claim must fail because, as a temporary employee, she had no right
to insist upon the statutory grievance procedures that the PMA provides. Further, because the

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 040905007
Page 3 of 5
PMA requires the State to establish rules for personnel management, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-6
to 67-19-10, a human resources employee handbook explaining those rules cannot create a
contractual obligation outside of the authorization of the PMA, and, thus, Plaintiffs claim still
must arise under the authority of the PMA.
Plaintiff correctly notes thai a personnel policy manual can form the basis for a contract.
See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992) (holding that "[ejmployees
necessarily rely on a county's statement of procedures governing layoffs and conduct themselves
accordingly," and "the expectations created by a personnel policies manual justify such a
reliance."). However, even if the employee handbook is sufficient to form the basis of a
contractual obligation, as the embodiment of the rules adopted by the State Department of
Human Resource Management ("the Department") as authorized by the PMA, the handbook does
not alter or amend the terms of public employment under the PMA. Because the PMA relies
upon the Department to create rules enumerating the specific terms of employment PMA for
some classes of employees, the PMA essentially incorporates those rules, and thus, they cannot
alter or amend the terms of employment under the PMA. Therefore, the handbook has no impact
on the Plaintiffs status as a statutory employee. Although Plaintiff arguably might maintain a
suit to enforce the terms of the employee handbook, as a statutory employee, her claim would
arise from the PMA rather than from a contract for purposes of the statute of limitations and the
GIA.

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 040905007
Page 4 of 5
Thus, even if the Court takes the allegations of Plaintiff s claim as true, her failure to file
a timely notice of claim under the GIA and her failure to commence her action within tliree years
of its accrual deprive the Court of jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claim.
Dated this

/ D day ol January, 2005.

Erme W. Jones, Judge

Memorandum Decision
Case No. 040905007
Page 5 of 5
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 11/ day of January, 2005,1 sent a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ruling to counsel as follows:
Brad C. Smith
Benjamin C. Rasmussin
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Plaintiff
Mark L. Shurtleff
Geoffrey T. Landward
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Attorney for Defendants

Exhibit C
District Court Order for Dismissal
February 25, 2005

Brad C. Smith No 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C.
3986 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone (801)399-9910
Facsimile- (801) 399-9954
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
NICOLE H. CODE, f.k.a. NICOLE L.
HANDRAHAN,

ORDER

Plaintiff,
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, and
UTAH SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND
BLIND,

Civil No. 040905007
Judge Ernie W. Jones

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Utah R. Civ. 12(b)(6). The Court having been fully apprised of this matter and having
issued its Memorandum Decision dated 10 January 2005, and based therefore, the
Court orders that Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice
DATED this,2if day of February, 2005.
sf

rv^A-

(Dismissed with prejudice)

District Court Judcje

35007

VD18336280
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Exhibit D
Order of Court of Appeals
May 19, 2005

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAY 19 2005
ooOoo
Nicole H. Code, fka Nicole
L. Handrahan

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,

C a s e N o . 20050255-CA

v.
Utah Department of Health and
Utah State School for the
Deaf and Blind,
Defendant and Appellee.

T h i s m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h e c o u r t on A p p e l l e e s ' s m o t i o n f o r
summary d i s p o s i t i o n f o r l a c k of j u r i s d i c t i o n . A p p e l l e e c o n t e n d s t h e Memorandum D e c i s i o n o f J a n u a r y 1 0 ,
2005 was a f i n a l , a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t , a n d t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l
was n o t t i m e l y .
A p p e l l a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e memorandum d e c i s i o n
was n o t a f i n a l o r d e r p u r s u a n t t o r u l e 7 ( f ) o f t h e U t a h R u l e s of
C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , a n d t h a t t h e a p p e a l was t i m e l y f i l e d w i t h i n
t h i r t y d a y s o f e n t r y of t h e F e b r u a r y 2 5 , 2 005 o r d e r o f d i s m i s s a l .
We d e f e r a r u l i n g o n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e
m o t i o n a n d r e s p o n s e p e n d i n g f u l l b r i e f i n g of t h e a p p e a l a n d
consideration by t h e c o u r t .
S e e Utah R. A p p . P . 1 0 ( f ) ("As t o
a n y i s s u e r a i s e d b y a m o t i o n f o r summary d i s p o s i t i o n , t h e c o u r t
may d e f e r i t s r u l i n g u n t i l p l e n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n
of t h e c a s e . " )
IT I S HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e m o t i o n f o r summary d i s p o s i t i o n
i s denied, a n d a r u l i n g on t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d t h e r e i n i s d e f e r r e d
p e n d i n g p l e n a r y p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e c a s e . The
appeal s h a l l proceed t o t h e next stage.
Dated

this

n

day o f May,

FOR THE COURT:

mdith M. Billings,
Judith
Presiding Judge

<J

2005

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on May 19, 2005, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to
the parties listed below:
BRENT A. BURNETT
DEBRA J MOORE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856
GEOFFREY LANDWARD
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR
PO BOX 140833
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0833
BRAD C. SMITH
BENJAMIN C RASMUSSEN
STEVENSON & SMITH PC
3986 WASHINGTON BLVD
OGDEN UT 84403
Dated this May 19, 2005.

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20050255
District Court No. 040905007

Exhibit E
Court of Appeals Opinion
March 23, 2006

This memorandum decision is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Nicole H. Code fka Nicole L.
Handrahan,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 20050255-CA
F I L E D
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Before Judges Bench, McHugh, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
fl
We have determined that n[t]he facts and legal arguments are
adequately presented in the briefs and record [,] and the
decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). We conclude we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal because Appellant's notice of
appeal was untimely.
%2 Under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an
appeal is allowed from "final orders and judgments." Utah R.
App. P. 3(a). The rules also specify that the notice of appeal
must be filed "within 3 0 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Thus,
the thirty-day period begins with the entry of a judgment or
other final order.
^3
"[F]or a judgment to be final and start the time for appeal
to run, there must be a judgment which is definite and

unequivocal in finally disposing of the matter." Utah State
Bldcr. Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141,
144 (1965) . The district court's Memorandum Decision here was
just such a disposition, explicitly dismissing Appellant's claim.
"The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that an order is final
where 'the effect of the order . . . was to determine substantial
rights . . . and to terminate finally the litigation' . . . ."
Harris v. 1ES Assocs., inc., 2003 UT App 112,1(56, 69 P.3d 297
(first: and second omissions in original) (citation omitted). The
parties' substantive rights in this case were definitively and
unequivocally determined by the Memorandum Decision; the
decision's unambiguous language was clearly intended to end the
litigation.
1|4 At the end of its signed Memorandum Decision, after setting
forth its thorough legal analysis, the district court concluded:
"For the reasons stated above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's
claim." No further order was invited or contemplated by the
terms of the Memorandum Decision, nor is such even implied by the
decision's language. Cf. State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2,1(9, 65
P.3d 1180 (n[W]here further action is contemplated by the express
language of the order, it cannot be a final determination
susceptible of enforcement.") (emphasis added). Thus, Appellant
had thirty days from the date the Memorandum Decision was
entered--January 10, 2005--to file her notice of appeal. The
notice was not filed, however, until March 8, 2005--long after
the thirty-day period had ended. We therefore lack jurisdiction
to hear this appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT
App 299,17, 13 P.3d 616, cert, denied, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001).
1f5 Appellant disagrees, arguing that the relevant date to
determine timeliness of the appeal is February 25, 2 005, the date
the district court signed the order of dismissal that she
eventually submitted. The subsequent order, however, did not
restart the time for appeal because the order did not alter the
substantive rights of the parties in any way; it did nothing more
than reiterate the dismissal already fully effectuated by the
Memorandum Decision.1 See Foster v. Montgomery, 2 0 03 UT App
4 05,1(18, 82 P.3d 191 ("Where a judgment is reentered, and the
subsequent judgment does not alter the substantive rights
affected by the first judgment, the time for appeal runs from the

x

The order, in its entirety, simply states: "This matter
came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pursuant
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court having been fully
apprised of this matter and having issued its Memorandum Decision
dated 10 January 20 05, and based there[on], the Court orders that
Plaintiff's claims are dismissed with prejudice."
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first judgment.") (internal quotations and citation omitted),
cert, denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).
f6
Appellant additionally argues that the January 10 order was
not final because further action was required by rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the
prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's
decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in
conformity with the court's decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (2) .
This, however, is simply the default rule that applies to those
situations where responsibility for preparation of the court's
order has not been "otherwise directed by the court."2 Id. When
the court issues its own Memorandum Decision, which explicitly
and unambiguously dismisses the underlying claim without inviting
submission of a further order, it leaves nothing more to be done.
Such clear action by the trial court necessarily serves under
rule 7(f)(2) as direction from the court that the prevailing
party need not draft an order, and thus renders the Memorandum
Decision final and appealable.
%7

Accordingly, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

f8

I CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench,
Presiding Judge

McHUGH, Judge (concurring):
1|9
I concur in the main opinion. I write separately to address
the possible confusion created by the conflict between the
controlling precedent and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
2

Appellant's reliance on the plain language of rule 7 is
paradoxical at best, as Appellant was not "the prevailing party"
and did not submit her proposed order "within fifteen days after
the court's decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2). Nor did the
district court "direct []" Appellant, rather than the prevailing
party, to submit an order. Id.
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cases from this court and the Utah Supreme Court that are cited
by the majority hold that a decision of the trial court that
fully determines the substantive rights of the parties is final
for purposes of appeal absent express language to the contrary.
See State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2,1(9, 65 P.3d 1180; Harris v.
IES Assocs. , 2003 UT App 112,1|56, 69 P.3d 297.
1fl0 However, rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in relevant part:
(f)(1) An order includes every direction
of che court, including a minute order
entered in writing, not included in a
judgment. . . .
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the
proposed order submitted with an initial
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by
the court, the prevailing party shall, within
fifteen days after the court's decision,
serve upon the other parties a proposed order
in conformity with the court's decision.
Objections to the proposed order shall be
filed within five days after service. The
party preparing the order shall file the
proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to
object.
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).1
Kll Thus, while the clear precedent from Utah appellate courts
holds that a decision of the trial court is final for purposes of
appeal unless the written decision expressly requires further
action, see Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2 at 1|9; Harris, 2003 UT App 112
at 1f56, rule 7(f) contemplates that a subsequent order will be
entered after every decision unless the court directs otherwise,
see Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f). The presumption under the Utah Supreme
x

The substance of what is now rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure was previously contained in the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration. See Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501 to 4-509
(noting that rule 4-504 was repealed effective November 1, 2003,
and replaced with a comparable provision in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure). Effective November 1, 2003, subpart (f) was
added to rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah
R. Civ. P. 7 & amendment notes (providing that the 2 003
amendment, which added subpart (f), became effective November 1,
2003).
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Court authority is in favor of finality, while the presumption in
rule 7(f) is that a further order is required. Although the case
law specifically addresses the issue of finality for purposes of
appeal, while the rule is concerned with appropriate procedure,
the interaction between the two can lead to confusion for
practitioners.
fl2 The timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.
See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 200cfuT App 299,f7, 13 P.3d
616. Consequently, correctly assessing the time at which a
decision becomes final for purposes of appeal is critical.
Because the procedure set forth in rule 7(f) may lull
practitioners into the mistaken belief that a decision of the
trial court does not become final for purposes of appeal until an
order is entered, clarity in the initial memorandum decision is
essential. I believe the better practice for all concerned is
for the decision to state expressly either that "no further order
is necessary" or that the prevailing party "shall prepare an
order implementing this court's decision."
fl3 I agree with the majority that the Memorandum Decision here
completely resolved the substantive rights of the parties,
dismissed the complaint, and did not expressly require any
further action. Yet, I am sympathetic to the difficulty in
assessing the proper moment when the decision becomes final for
purposes of appeal when the trial court is silent on that issue.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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